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The reply briefs effectively avoid the overriding fact, possession~ which drives the analysis 
and application of the legal theories involved, whether underlying contract terms, specific 
performance, resulting trust, application of statutes of limitation, or the underlying equities of the 
parties. The legal and factual analysis of each of the legal principles involved necessarily begins 
differently, but all involve the undisputed fact that as of 2006 Marcel and Doris Gentillon had 
enjoyed continuous possession of the property they agreed to accept eight years before, and the 
GentilIon Partnership had possession of the property it agreed to accept from Marcel and Doris for 
the same time. 
Possession informs us as to the intent of the parties, informs us as to the reasons for and 
language of the 1998 exchange agreement, informs us as to what Darren Leavitt as a surveyor was 
requested to do, informs us as to how he discovered the encroachment of the house on the west 
boundary of the homestead in early 1999, informs us as to what oral modifications were considered 
and approved by Marcel and the Partnership through Mont, informs us as to the accuracy of the 
Leavitt survey, and informs us as to the reliance by Marcel and the Partnership on that survey, 
including the installation of fences and irrigation equipment, all of which are consistent with and lay 
the foundation of the possession enjoyed by the parties without objection from 1999 until Marcel 
attempted to fe-sell part of the exchanged land to the Petersons in 2006. 
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The fact of exchanged possession, recognized by the trial court, drives the equitable 
application of the resulting trust doctrine to the underlying contract and specific performance of that 
contract, and the implicit avoidance of the harsh and inequitable application of the Statute of 
Limitations which would otherwise deprive the Gentillon Partnership of their possessory, equitable 
interest in the farmland they purchased and ran for eight years. 
Lastly, the fact of possession as developed above erodes the applicability of many of the legal 
authorities relied upon by the Petersons and the Gentillons in their reply briefs. 
II. ISSUES ADDRESSED 
A. Issues 1,2 and 3 ofPetersons' Reply Brief 
B. Issues 1 and 2 of the Gentillons' Reply Brief 
Critical evaluation of the factual record presented the fIrst two days of trial in October, 2009, 
with respect to the 1998 exchange agreement (Exhibit A), requires recognition that the 
encroachment of the house on the west boundary of the homestead (the garden spot) was not 
discovered by Darren Leavitt until a month after the December 1998 '\vntten exchange agreement 
was negotiated, executed, and partially performed, and secondly, none of the witnesses recalled 
Leavitt's belated discovery during those fIrst two days of trial. The third day of trial in December, 
2010, was necessitated because no one had recalled that encroachment, which was re-discovered as 
the result of the court ordered survey in 20 I O. 
The critical point with respect to the December 1998 exchange agreement between The 
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Gentillons and the Gentillon Partnership is that the wTitten agreement was later orally modified as 
the result of the surveyor Darren Leavitt's discovery of the encroachment of the house on the west 
boundary of the homestead in January of 1999, prior to the completion of his survey. Tr., VoL 1, 
p. 433, L.12-16. Leavitt testified at length on the third day of trial, which was necessitated because 
none of the parties or witnesses had recalled the encroachment, or resolution of the encroachment, 
during the first two days of trial. 
The second discovery of the encroachment refreshed everyone's recollection, and helps to 
explain why much of the trial testimony during the fust two days was and at times inconsistent 
with the evidence offered on the third day of trial, when everyone's recollection had been refreshed. 
Darren Leavitt testified during the third day of trial that upon discovery of the encroachment, he 
discussed the possible resolution of modifying the agreement to equalize the property exchange by 
adding the area of the garden spot to the property being conveyed to Marcel and Doris, and deducting 
from Marcel and Doris equivalent land from the adjusted south boundary ofthe homestead. Tr., Vol. 
1, p.434, L. 7 to p. 435, L. 9; Tr., VoL 1, p.437, L. 1 to p. 438, L. 15. Leavitt testified both agreed 
to that proposed exchange. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 433, L.12 to p. 434, L. 6; Tr., VoL 1, p. 437 to L.l to p. 
438, L. 15. Marcel admitted on the third day oftestimony that he agreed to the exchange. Tr., Vol. 
1, p., 428, L. 5-12. Leavitt testified he completed the survey, and staked the survey corners based 
on that agreement. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 438, L. 16 to p. 439, L. 8. Marcel admitted that he thereafter 
constructed the fence using Leavitt's survey stakes on the west side of the property as a guide. Tr., 
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Vol. 1, p. 374, L. 11 top. 375, L. 12. Marcel had earlier testified he placed the south boundary fence 
using Leavitt's south boundary survey stakes as a guide. Tr., VoL I, p. 146, L. 3 to p.I47, L. 14; p. 
153, L. 18 to p. 155, L. 2; p. 166, L. 3-16; p. 221, L.21 to p.222, L. 18. Both parties testified 
possession was thereafter based on those fence lines. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 131, L.24 to p. 132, L. 13; p. 
138,L.13 top. 145,L. 8;p.147,L.1-14. The effect of these agreements and resulting survey was 
that Marcel and Doris had possession of the "garden spof' based on the oral agreement engineered 
by Leavitt, Tr., Vol. 1, p. 375, L. 25 to p. 376, L. 19, and the Partnership had possession the 
property south of the adjusted south line of the homestead based on the exchange. As was explained 
at page 9 of the Appellant's brief, the land exchanged was essentially equal, as contemplated by the 
exchange agreement (Exhibit A). The parties continued that exchanged possession without 
controversy for eight years. The Partnership contends that are no facts in the record regarding 
possession contrary to the above assertions, and further contends the trial court so found. R., Vol 
1, p. 667; p. 671. 
We do not disagree with the Petersons' assertion that the Partnership agreed to transfer the 
garden spot back to Marcel and Dons, as that promise was the quid pro quo for equalization of the 
property to be exchanged through adjustment ofthe south boundary. We do not disagree with the 
Petersons' assertion that the deed for the garden spot was not addressed in the December 1998, 
exchange agreement (Exhibit I), as the problem was not discovered or identified at the time of the 
preparation and execution of that document. In contrast to the Petersons' statement of facts 
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indicating the parties did not exchange possession of the parcels now being contested, the evidence 
is uncontroverted. Possession was exchanged in 1999, and remained as such until the conclusion 
of the 2011 crop year. See the factual recitation regarding the exchange of possession set forth in 
Appellants' Brief at pages 8-9, which the trial court acknowledged. It, VoL 1, p. 667, 671. 
We contend the exchange agreement (contract) as orally modified was executory on both 
sides, and required both the Gentillons and the Partnership to execute deeds. At paragraphs 2 and 
3 of the 1998 Agreement (Exhibit A), Marcel (on behalf of the Gentillons) agreed to convey certain 
parcels of property to West and Mont (the Partnership). Paragraph 3 calls for the preparation of a 
survey to obtain legal descriptions. The survey was completed as required. Wes and Mont did 
everything required of them, except for the execution of deeds. Exhibit 1, Paragraph 6 requires the 
execution of documents necessary to effectuate the agreement. The oral modification implicitly 
required the Partnership to deed the garden spot back to Marcel and Doris, and Marcel and Doris to 
execute and deliver a deed to the Partnership to complete the exchange agreement. 
Neither party demanded execution and delivery of the deeds necessary to conclude the 
transaction, even though either party was entitled to do so. Both parties were apparently comfortable 
with the survey, subsequent exchange of possession, and construction of fences, as to which neither 
party complained for eight or nine years. 
With respect to the legal authorities cited by the Petersons, we stand on the principle 
enunciated in Love v. Watkins, 40 Cal. 547 (1871). Possession of the disputed property \Yas 
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exchanged, and not questioned until this litigation commenced. The Partnership requests only that 
property which has been in its possession since 1999, and nothing more. There is no evidence 
indicating the Partnership was not in possession of the disputed property, and there is no evidence 
of any complaint with respect to that possession until this litigation began. 
Petersons' reliance on Singleton v. Foster, 98 Idaho 149, 559 P.2d 765 (1977) is 
misplaced. That case did not involve a change of possession, but did result in a remand to the 
district court to determine what event triggered the running of a statute of limitations with respect 
to a claim for specific performance. 
Williams v. Havens, 92 Idaho 439, 443, 444 P.2d 132, 136 (1968), is inapplicable, as that 
case turned on formal service of notice of default required by the underlying contract. Here, the 
contract does not address any notice requirement, and more importantly, none was ever sent, simply 
because the parties were satisfied with the status quo. Given the exchange of possession and the 
absence of any demand, the principle enunciated in Love, supra, is appropriately applied here. 
iilcCandless v. Schick, 85 Idaho 509, 518, 380 P.2d 893, 898 (1963), is inapplicable, since 
the parties here (the GentiHons and the Partnership) were both required to execute and deliver deeds 
under the wTitten agreement as orally modified. 
Turning to the authorities cited by the Gentillons, the issue in Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., 103 
Idaho 912, 655 P.2d 119 (1982), was whether a contract or tort statute of limitations was 
appropriately applied, and if so, what event triggered the running of the statute oflimitations under 
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either theory. The case did not involve specific perfonnance or any other equitable remedy, and at 
best, is no more than irrelevant dictum for the principles at issue here. 
The Gentillons suggest Love, supra, did not involve a contract based specific perfonnance 
statute oflimitations. To the contrary, that was the precisely the basis for the trial court's application 
of the Statute of Limitations, which was overruled on appeal, by application of the resulting trust 
doctrine to the property in possession of the appellant there. That result is what we seek 
here-application of the resulting trust theory to the property the possession of which had been 
transferred in 1999 . To that extent the appellate decision in Love directly overrules a trial court 
decision which had applied the same rule as was applied here. As in Love, the appeUate court here 
should overrule the trial court. 
The Gentillons next argue the underlying agreement was unenforceable, based on the statute 
of frauds, and further unenforceable under the doctrine of partial perfonnance exception to the 
statute of frauds. Assuming for the sake of argument only that the specificity required of the legal 
description required to meet the partial perfonnance requirement is a necessary element for 
application of the resulting trust doctrine, which we question, we again tum to the undisputed fact 
of possession, the boundaries of which are undisputed and which have been undisputed since 1999, 
and to the Darren Leavitt survey (Exhibit 10) upon which that possession was based. The written 
agreement (Exhibit A) as orally modified could call into play the statute of frauds and the doctrine 
of partial perfonnance. The legal description based on the wTitten agreement and oral modification 
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of the parties, not only was "capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty," Bauchman-
Kingston Partnership, IP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87 at 92, 233 P.3d 18 (2008), but was in fact 
reduced to certainty with the completion of the Leavitt survey (Exhibit 10), and the placing of the 
survey markers, which was relied upon by the parties, including MarceL In addition to the all 
important fact of eight years' of uninterrupted possession, the Gentillon Partnership paid $200,000, 
exchanged additional valuable land, and improved the property through the addition of the pivot with 
required underground mainline and electrical wire. To the extent of its relevance, the underlying 
contract existed, the legal description was certain, and would have been enforceable under the partial 
perfonnance doctrine. 
The Gentillons argue there is no evidence showing intent to create a resulting trust, relying 
on dictum in Herman ex rei Herman v. Herman, 136 Idaho 781, 41 P.3d 209 (2002), a case which 
did not involve real estate, and perhaps more importantly on Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 44, 324 
P.2d 380 (1958), which did involve real estate. Again, the transfer of possession pursuant to the 
written agreement as orally modified, uncontested and unquestioned for eight years, is the best 
indication of the intent of the parties. 
As a general rule, a resulting trust arises only where such may 
reasonably be presumed to be the intention of the parties as 
determined from the facts and circumstances existing at the time of 
the transaction. Smith v. Smith, 143 Fla. 159, 196 So. 409; Sands v. 
Church of the Ascension, etc., 181 Md. 536, 30 A2d 771; Baskett v. 
Crook, 86 CaLApp.2d 355,195 P.2d 39; 89 C.J.s. Trusts § 102 b, p. 
947. In Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash.2d 345, 196 P.2d 835,840, the 
rule is stated: 
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'* * * the whole doctrine of resulting trusts is founded upon the 
principle of a presumed intention to create a trust, and where the facts 
and circumstances are such as reasonably indicate an absence of such 
intention or indicate a contrary intention the principle should not be 
applied.' 
Shurrum, supra. The pertinent ··facts and circumstances" showing the intent of the parties to hold 
the land (in trust) pending the completion of the survey are recited as follows. The three parties 
entered into the sale and exchange agreement (Exhibit A) requiring the Partnership to pay Scott 
$200,000, and to transfer part of the land which had been Scott's farm to Marcel and Doris in 
exchange for equal parcels of farmland "so that the farmable acreage in Marcel's retained portion 
of Lot I equals the farmable acreage in Section 16" See Exhibit Paragraph 4. The written 
agreement was orally modified to add the garden sot to Marcel's land, deducting an equal amount 
to be deeded to the Partnership, identified as ~that portion south of the south line of Parcel T -10032 
extended and any adjustment required under Paragraph 4 when the survey is obtained." Exhibit A, 
paragraph 2. The parties performed that agreement without a problem for eight years, failing only 
to exchange deeds. No evidence of a different intent of either party exists. The above recitation of 
facts also shows payment of consideration in the form of both cash and land sufficient to satisfY a 
"purchase money" resulting trust with respect to the property deeded in December 1998, which was 
subject to the contemplated changes required by the survey. Heftinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 
886 P.2d 772, (1994), cited by the Gentillons. 
At pages 17 and 18 of the Gentillon's reply brief, reference is made to extensive testimony 
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of the parties' lack of recollection. The testimony to which the Gentillons refer was all offered 
during the first two days of trial when all witnesses failed to recall Leavitt's discovery of the 
encroachment of the house on the west boundary of the homestead~ the additional negotiations, and 
oral agreement by Marcel, which resolved the problem. Any lack of recollection or confusion was 
largely clarified by the third day trial testimony, when witnesses' memories were refreshed by the 
re-discovery ofthe "garden spot" encroachment. Again, the voluntary exchange of possession based 
on the Leavitt survey is the uncontroverted fact which further informs us as to the parties' intent. 
ill. GARDEN SPOT 
The trial court's failure to set forth findings of fact or conclusions oflaw explaining why the 
'~garden spot" should be awarded to the Petersons draws three explanation in the reply briefs, one 
by the Petersons, and two by the Gentillons. 
The Petersons advance the theory of "deed by estoppel", citing Quirkv. Bedal, 42 Idaho 567, 
248 P.2d 447 (1926), apparently for the proposition that '''deed by estoppel" should properly be 
applied here. That elements of that theory were not pled, were not supported factually, were not 
discussed or argued below, and were not articulated by the trial court in its Findings of Fact or 
Conclusions of Law as a basis for its decision. We do acknowledge the Gentillon Partnership orally 
agreed to transfer the garden spot to Marcel and Doris, but only as a part of the executory agreement 
for the exchange of property ultimately consummated. However, the Quirk decision does not appear 
to be similar factually in any way. The Quirk decision estopped a person from claiming an interest 
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in property after affinnatively mis-representing her non-ownership of a co-owned interest in the 
same property, which induced a second party to bid at a sheriff's sale. The facts appear to support 
a fraud in the inducement theory, and the decision turns strongly on the unfair conduct of the party 
estopped. We are unable to detennine from that case the elements of the "deed by estoppel" theory 
now advanced, as contrasted with an estoppel by deed, or the relevance of the Quirk decision, supra, 
to the case now before the court. 
The Gentillons posit one of their arguments on adverse possession, relying exclusively on 
the conduct of the relevant parties between 1991 and 1996. the extent the evidence shows Marcel 
and Doris remained in possession ofiliat property after the 1991 sale to Scott and Tracy, we have 
no dispute. However, there is no showing of any adversity; the best the Gentillons could offer based 
on the record would be a mutual mistake as the location of the boundary, and whatever relief might 
be available under that factual scenario, which is not supported here by any evidence, prior argument 
to the trial court, or findings and conclusions of the trial court. 
Even if the GentilIons could establish adversity, the evidence does not sustain a finding that 
the Gentillons paid property taxes on the one third acre "'garden spot," which is an area as large as 
many city building lots. Payment of taxes is required to establish a claim for adverse possession. 
Idaho Code § 5-210. Third Party Defendants' Exhibit 18 is infonnative. It is the Bingham County 
assessor's record for taxation of Parcel T -10032, the Gentillon homestead, not including the garden 
spot. Third Party Defendants' Exhibit 18, which was introduced into evidence through Ronald J. 
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Simmons, the Bingham County Assessor. Tr., VoL 1, p. 452, L. 18 top. 454, L. 16. Thatdocument 
reflects an acreage of 8.48 acres being assessed to Marcel and Doris Gentillon. See Third Party 
Defendants' Exhibit 18. The record further reflects the GentiHon homestead is a rectangular parcel, 
820 feet by 450 feet. See Exhibit 5, Parcel III exception, which is the deed from Marcel and Doris 
to Scott and Tracy, reserving the homestead to Marcel and Doris. The area of the homestead is 
369,000 square feet, which is an acreage of8.471 acres, determined by dividing the total square feet 
by the number of square feet an acre, 43,560. The assessor rounded the acreage to 8.48 acres. See 
Third Party Defendants' Exhibit 18. The parcel assessed therefore does not include the .33 acre 
garden spot, indicated on Leavitt's survey, Exhibit 10. The conclusion is inevitable: the garden spot 
was not included in the Gentillon tax assessment, taxes were not paid on the parcel, and the claim 
of adverse possession fails. The trial court was correct to the extent its decision does not rest upon 
an adverse possession claim, which it does not address. 
Lastly, but inexplicably, the Gentillons rely on a theory of resulting trust for their claim to 
the garden spot. Hettinga, supra, at 470, states that a resulting trust arises when property is 
transferred to a trustee, although another party, the beneficiary, paid the purchase price, \\lith the 
apparent intent to hold legal title as a trustee in order for the beneficiary of the trust to enjoy the 
beneficial interest in the property. While we agree with the result suggested by the Gentillons with 
respect to the garden spot transfer, the GentiUons overlook the consideration to be transferred to the 
Partnership, i.e., the equivalent amount of land, which is the land at issue here. It is the land to be 
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exchanged which satisfies the Hettinga, requirement of a transfer of one person with the 
consideration being provided by another person which establishes the foundation upon which the 
resulting trust theory proceeds. 
Using the Partnership logic, we have identified the land to be exchanged, the possession of 
which in fact was exchanged, which satisfies the Hettinga requirement of consideration. The 
Gentillons resulting trust argument satisfies the Hettinga requirement only if they concede the 
exchange agreement to be performed. We respectfully submit the facts and logic lead inevitably to 
the enforcement of the agreed upon exchange of possession, and the enforcement of the land 
exchange as described in the Leavitt survey. 
IV. FARMABLEACREAGE 
The Gentillons raise an issue about the term «farmable acreage" found in the 1998 agreement, 
implicitly contending there may have been a discrepancy between the acreage identified in the 
Leavitt survey (Exhibit 10) and the acreage farmed. The issue was not addressed in the court's 
Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law, and the issue was not raised by way of argument or post 
trial briefing after presentation of the following evidence, offered in response to the court's oral 
question during trial. 
Mont Gentillon testified the comer where the east west fence line meets the river could not 
be farmed because the farming equipment could not be maneuvered into the comer, but that corner 
was no different than any other farm field comer. Tr., Vol. I, p. 353, L. 2-15. With respect to the 
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land along the river bank, Mont testified he farmed as close to the edge of the bank as possible 
without destroying the bank. Tr., Vol. I, p. 353, L 13 to p. 354, L 4. Marcel Gentillon agreed that 
he farmed up to the river. Tr., VoL I, p. 334, L 22 to p. 335, L 9. 
In summary, there was no evidence the transferred land was not "farmable," and therefore 
no material discrepancy with the acreage as determined by the Leavitt survey, Exhibit 10. 
V. THE PETERSONS' RESPONSE PERTAINING TO EASEMENTS 
The evidence, the rulings of the court and the [mal judgment address three easements: (I) the 
easement for the roadway east from the canal to homestead for ingress and egress, reserved to 
Marcel and Doris in Exhibit 5, the deed from Marcel and Doris to Scott and Tracy, and repeated in 
the deed from Scott and Tracy to the Partnership, Exhibit 6; (2) The easement for ingress and egress 
from the canal west to the highway, initially reserved to Marcel and Doris, but subsequently 
conveyed to the Partnership, and (3) the easement for the irrigation system across the southwest 
corner of the homestead. 
The Partnership has not appealed the trial court's decision with respect to issues 2 or 3 above, 
although we do not understand why the court in its Judgment and Judicial Deed addressed the 
easement west of the canal, (Easement (2) above) as no factual or legal dispute exists between these 
parties as to that easement, and no evidence was offered as to that issue, although we note that is the 
easement now the subject of litigation between the Petersons and the neighboring Collets, whose 
Petition to Intervene here was denied. 
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With respect to easement (1) above, the only easement issue involved in this appeal, the 
Petersons appear to raise an issue as to whether the roadway exceptions in the deeds (Exhibit 5, 
Parcel III), from Marcel and Doris to Scott and Tracy, (Exhibit 6, Tract Il), and the deed from Scott 
and Tracy to the Partnership, conveyed fee simple title to the grantee Partnership, reserving the 
easement for ingress and egress, or alternatively is a reservation of fee simple title with the 
conveyance of an easement. 
The language in Exhibit 6 excepts the ~'road access and easement over an existing private 
road to the County road." Since the reservation specifically uses the term "easement," we assert the 
grant, or property conveyed, to the Partnership is a fee simple title, subject to the reserved easement. 
The term "roadway" addresses both the purpose of the easement and helps to define its scope. 
Exhibit 111 is a photograph showing the roadway in question, taken from the corner of homestead 
looking west toward the canaL The GentiliollS do not dispute the existence of a roadway easement 
reserved by Marcel and Doris which has now been conveyed to the PetersollS. We acknowledge the 
width was undefined, and take the position the width of the existing roadway easement was not an 
issue at trial, that no evidence was adduced as to the width of the roadway, and that the court made 
no findings of fact with respect to its width. 
What was contested was the meaning and effect of the recording of a "Correction deed" by 
the Petersons in the spring of 2007, six months after the sale. (See Exhibit 2, page 2), which had the 
effect of unilaterally enlarging the size of the Petersons' easement south of the roadway and across 
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the Gentillon's mainline, an area with no history of use as a "roadway" or "access easement." No 
evidence was offered in support of a definition or enlargement of the easement; the judicial deed 
(drafted by the Petersons' counsel) gratuitously created and defined that easement. 
The appellate court should confmn the Partnership's fee simple title to the roadway, and 
confIrm the grant of an easement to the Petersons for no more than was initially retained by Marcel 
and Doris, i.e., "road access and easement over an existing road to the County road." See Exhibit 
6, Tract II, which is the deed from Marcel and Doris to Scott and Tracy, which identifies the reserved 
easement. 
VI. THE GENTILLONS' RESPONSE PERTAINING TO AN EASEMENT 
The GentilIons fail to identifY the facts in the record which support their argument. 
Conversely, the Partnership has supported its argument factually at pages 28-30 of the Appellant's 
Brief. 
The Gentillons cite Palmer v. Fitzpatrick, 97 Idaho 925, 927, 557 P.2d 203,205 (1976), to 
support their argument. We do not disagree with the easement principle set forth there; the court 
should re-confirm that the easement was for the limited purpose of ingress and egress over the 
existing roadway. There is no basis in the record, factually or legally, to increase the size of the 
easement, or to prohibit the continued agricultural use of the property by the owner of the servient 
estate, providing there is no interference \\ith the continued, previously established use by the owner 
of the dominant tenement. 
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Vll. WERE THE GENTILLONS PREVAILING PARTIES? 
This case arose out of the Gentillons' attempted re-sale of a portion of the property they had 
previously sold to the Partnership through their son Scott. While the Petersons would appear to have 
the right to seek damages against the GentiUons for a breach of the warranty contained the deed 
to them (Exhibit 2), for reasons not contained in the record the Petersons have not yet pursued that 
claim. Tr., VoL 1, p. 394, L. 4-7, even though Mr. Peterson admitted he (and his wife) didn't receive 
all the land described on the deed. Tr., VoL 1, p. 394, L. 1-3. Nevertheless, this entire case was 
caused by the improper conduct of the Gentillons in re-selling the property at issue, as noted by 
Court in its Order of February 10,2011, where the court observed, "The Gentillons did not tell the 
Petersons they had previously agreed to trade the land to the Partnership. Marcel's testimony that 
he forgot about the previous transaction is not credible .... " R Vol. 1, p. 672. The Trial Court in 
its February 10,201 1 AMENDEDFINDlNGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
FOLLOWING BENCH TRIAL allocated primary responsibility for the problem to the Gentillons 
and their son Scott. Clerk Tr. P 675. 
In Ace Realty, Inc. v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 682 P.2d 1289 (1984), the Court of Appeals 
affIrmed a trial court's refusal to award costs or fees on the basis that "each party had prevailed on 
some issues and each party was at fault on some issues." (Emphasis added.) Here the Gentillon 
Partnership was sued to quiet title to several small parcels, the most important of which was the 
triangular piece on the southwest comer of the homestead required for passage of an irrigation pivot. 
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Imposition of a resulting trust required the Partnership to name the Gentillons as parties defendant, 
as the conduct of the Gentillons was central to the remedies sought. The remedy ultimately 
fashioned by the trial court imposed the resulting trust on the comer of the GentiLlon homestead. 
The Trial Court properly exercised its discretion in determining the GentilIons were not the 
prevailing parties entitled to an award of costs and fees. 
Note that Petersons' Amended Complaint named the Gentillons as defendants. R, Vol 
1, p. 603, 608-09. 
VIII. IS THE UNDERL YINGCONTRACT A 'COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION' WHICH 
TRIGGERS AN AWARD OF FEES? 
The Gentillons argue the court erred in its analysis which appears to limit contract provisions 
for attorneys' fees to the scope ofIdaho Code § 12- I 20(3). To the extent the Trial Court's decision 
does so, we agree with the GentiUons. Neither Idaho Code § 12-120(3), !RCP 54 nor existing case 
law limit contractually based attorneys' fees to commercial transactions. 
Nevertheless, the award of attorneys' fees is only made to a prevailing party. IRCP 54( e )(1). 
The Partnership prevailed with respect to the most important issue to them, the right of ownership 
of the southwest homestead "comer" which was the Partnership's key requirement and stated 
purpose the 1998 exchange agreement, Exhibit A. The Partnership prevailed at trial on that issue, 
and to the extent the contract has application to that issue, the trial court's determination that each 
party prevailed in part is correct, and the trial court correctly denied fees on that basis. 
The claim for fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is similarly limited; in order to recover an 
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award of fees, one must fIrst be a "prevailing party." See Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
IX. BOUNDARY DISPUTES ARE NOT 'COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS' 
The trial court ruled the gravamen of the action here, a quiet title action and boundary 
dispute, was not a "commercial transaction," relying on Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State, 132 
Idaho 673,978 P.2d 233 (1999), a quiet title action in which the plaintiff prevailed, and Anderson 
v. Rex Hayes Family Trust, 145 Idaho 741,185 P3d 253 (2008), a boundary dispute case in which 
the Supreme court stated, "This court has upheld a lower court's ruling that commercial transactions 
generally do not include real estate transactions involving the ownership of property, such as an 
action to quiet title," citing Treasure Valley Concrete, supra. The case now before the court 
involves both a quiet title action and a boundary dispute; the trial court's decision was a correct 
application of existing Idaho law, and should be affirmed. 
None of the cases cited by the Gentillons are quiet title actions or boundary disputes. Farm 
Credit Bank of Spokane, v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 869 P.2d 1365 (1994) was a mortgage 
foreclosure; Lexington Heights Development LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 92 P3d 526 
(2004) arose from a contract to develop a subdivision, Watson v. Watson, 144 Idaho 214, 159 P3d 
851 (2007) arose from a real estate purchase for logging, and an accounting, Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 
Idaho 21, 936 P. 2d 219 (1997) arose from an agreement to fInance a farm real estate transaction, 
and Peterson v. Shore, 146 Idaho 476, 197 P 3d 789 (2008) arose from a business dispute regarding 
ownership of property. 
Page 19 of 24 
x. WAIVER OF OBJECTION REGARDING COSTS 
We do not dispute the rule that the failure to timely object to costs operates as a waiver. We 
do argue that even if such a waiver exists a trial court nevertheless has the discretion to strike 
claimed costs which our outside of the scope of the rule or not properly claimed. The Petersons do 
not question the trial court's discretion to strike such costs; the Petersons do suggest two alternative 
theories to sustain the award. 
The Petersons first argue the court ordered the survey, to be used for preparation of the 
Court's Judgment, and therefore the cost should be assessed against the Partnership. We first draw 
the appeUate court's attention to the language of the court's February 10, 2011, AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER FOLLOWING BENCH TRIAL 
"'Although all defendants were to some extent at fault in their failure 
to follow through with the 1998 agreement in seeing that the transfers 
were memorialized and recorded, it appears to the Court that the 
primary responsibility therefore rests with Scott and the GentiHons. 
They are therefore ordered to pay for a survey to be conducted to fully 
define that portion of the southwest comer ofT-10032 as described 
above." 
R., Vol 1, p. 615. 
The court ordered Scott and the Gentillons to pay for the survey, not the Peterson's, and not 
the Partnership. Even if the Petersons "volunteered" to pay the survey costs on behalf of the 
GentiHons, there remains the lack of any basis to include the survey costs under !RCP 54 {d)(l )(D) 
or !RCP 54 {d)(l )(E). 
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The second argument advanced is that if the lower Court erroneously approved the claimed 
survey costs under {RCP 54 (d)( I )(D), the appellate Court may nevertheless approve the claimed cost 
under {RCP 54 (d)( 1 )(E). As noted above, the trial court specifically ordered other parties (Scott and 
the GentiIlons) to pay the survey costs, and not the Gentillon Partnership. The Petersons could not 
have qualified their claim for survey costs under {RCP 54( d)(l )(E), given the court's prior Order 
respecting survey costs. 
XI. ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL VS. GENTILLONS 
The Gentillons argue they are entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal, under both the contract 
theory and under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). For the reasons set forth above, as the record now stands, 
we submit both parties prevailed in part and therefore attorney's fees should be denied to the 
Gentillons. 
With respect to the argument there is a commercial transaction involved, Treasure Valley 
Concrete, supra, and Anderson, supra, hold that quiet title cases and boundary dispute cases are not 
"commercial transactions" for the purposes of awarding fees. 
Alternatively, if the Appellate Court should determine that the Trial Court's decision should 
be reversed, and if the resulting trust theory is applied to all of the disputed ground as described in 
the Leavitt survey, the Gentillon Partnership may be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under the 
terms of the contract term in Exhibit A imposing attorneys' fees on the non-prevailing party for a 
breach of the exchange agreement. See Exhibit A, paragraph 9. We acknowledge the requirement 
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ofI.A.R. 41 (a) requiring the Partnership's claim for attorneys' fees as against the Gentillons to be 
presented in the first appellate brief, and the ruling in Bingham v. Montane Resource Assocs., 133 
Idaho 420, 987 P.2d 1035 (1999). We also note the exception provided in I.A.R. 41 (a), permitting 
a later claim for attorneys' fees under such conditions as the Court deems appropriate. While we 
initially perceived attorneys' fees would not be allowed in an equitable application of a resulting trust 
theory to be conceptually different than the otherwise unenforceable exchange agreement, and 
therefore submitted the initial appellate brief with that perception, in the event the court does 
consider a contract based award of fees, we respectfully submit an award of fees in favor of the 
Partnership, both at trial and on appeal, may be appropriate. 
Xll. COSTS ON APPEAL 
We assume costs on appeal ,"viiI be awarded to the party deemed to have prevailed on the 
appeal. I.A.R. 40( a). Accordingly, the Gentillon Partnership asserts it is entitled to an award of costs 
in the event the appellate court should rule in its favor. 
XIll. CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit the Appellate Court should reverse the Trial Court with respect to 
the trial court's refusal to apply the resulting trust theory to all of the property in the Gentillon 
Partnership's possession as described by the Leavitt survey (Exhibit 10), should modifY the Trial 
Court's ruling to provide that the easement from the canal east to the homestead is limited to the 
existing roadway, and should further modifY the Trial Court's ruling prohibiting the Partnership from 
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using the land within the easement for the agricultural purposes incidental to irrigating their crops 
and storing sprinkler pipe when necessary to till, plant or harvest their crops. Costs and fees both 
at trial and on appeal should be awarded on the basis of the appellate court's determination of the 
prevailing party. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITfED this~day of Decernber, 201 L 
BAKER&HARRlS 
Dwight E. Baker 
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